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Abstract Interactions between corporations and nonpro-
fits are on the rise, frequently driven by a corporate interest
in establishing credentials for corporate social responsi-
bility (CSR). In this article, we show how increasing
demands for accountability directed at both businesses and
NGOs can have the unintended effect of compromising the
autonomy of nonprofits and fostering their co-optation.
Greater scrutiny of NGO spending driven by self-appointed
watchdogs of the nonprofit sector and a prevalence of
strategic notions of CSR advanced by corporate actors
weaken the ability of civil society actors to change the
business practices of their partners in the commercial
sector. To counter this trend, we argue that corporations
should embrace a political notion of CSR and should
actively encourage NGOs to strengthen ‘‘downward
accountability’’ mechanisms, even if this creates more
tensions in corporate–NGO partnerships. Rather than see-
ing NGOs as tools in a competition for a comparative
advantage in the market place, corporations should actively
support NGO independence and critical capacity.
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Introduction
Corporations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
face increasing pressures for greater accountability. On the
one hand, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has
increased the demand for NGO–business partnerships as a
means to establish credentials of responsible corporate
citizenship. On the other hand, NGOs themselves face
increasing scrutiny for their actions by a new set of
watchdogs, such as Charity Navigator and others. Donors
increasingly demand efficient use of resources and promote
corporate practices as a means of increasing the effec-
tiveness of NGOs (Pallotta 2008; Edwards 2010). In par-
ticular, there has been mounting pressure for NGOs to
provide quantifiable results of their activities (Schmitz and
Mitchell 2009; Lucea 2010). As both corporations and
NGOs face increased public scrutiny, partnerships between
them are supposed to represent a ‘‘win–win’’ for both sides,
providing enhanced legitimacy to corporations and
increased revenue and/or influence to NGOs. Ideally, if
both sides become more accountable for their actions and
face greater public scrutiny, their overall impact on society
should improve over time. In particular, one could expect
that if increased collaboration across the for-profit/non-
profit divide can be shown to yield such positive results,
civil society could play a heightened role in shaping
business practices and could thereby at least partially
compensate for diminished governmental capacities in
advancing human rights and environmental protection.
Yet, counter to the claims that increased accountability
demands will improve business practices and strengthen
the voice of NGOs, we argue here that such pressures—
especially when translated into partnerships between cor-
porations and nonprofits—actually increase the likelihood
of co-optation and compromise the independence of NGOs.
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We define co-optation as the process of aligning NGO
interests with those of corporations and argue that such co-
optation manifests itself in sponsoring relationships,
labeling agreements, and the personal ties established with
corporate leaders. Traditionally, many NGOs engaged in
consumer or shareholder activism (Dahan et al. 2010) and
use adversarial strategies of litigating against corporate
malpractice, conducting critical research, and fostering
public education (Utting 2005). But as accountability
pressures on corporations and NGOs create incentives to
embark on new roles by strengthening the ties between
them, it is imperative for both sides to recognize that such
ties can undermine the credibility of NGOs as critical
partners and thus also diminish the legitimacy gains for
corporate actors.
The article is organized as follows. The first section
provides a brief overview of the theoretical concept of co-
optation and discusses the different roles NGOs can play in
their interactions with the corporate sector. We show how
co-optation takes place and what types of specific rela-
tionships between corporate and nonprofit organizations
have recently emerged. Our focus is specifically on spon-
soring and labeling arrangements as well as increased
personal ties between the corporate and the nonprofit sec-
tors. Although none of these arrangements and mechanisms
necessarily must lead to increased co-optation, we argue
that they often do because (1) the consequences of such
partnerships are rarely fully analyzed by parties before
entering into collaborative arrangements and (2) rarely are
such partnerships accompanied by explicit efforts to pre-
serve and strengthen the independence of NGOs.
Following the exploration of the ‘‘demand side’’ for
possible co-optation, the next section switches perspectives
to the ‘‘supply side’’ by showing how increased account-
ability pressures on NGOs push those organizations into
potentially hazardous partnerships with corporations.
While NGOs have long struggled to better balance the
influence of donors with a desire to increase ‘‘downward
accountability’’ to beneficiaries, these endeavors are
undermined by an increased array of stakeholders
demanding attention ‘‘from above.’’ Since NGOs fre-
quently call on others to be more accountable for their
actions, ‘‘the challenge for NGOs is to show they can put
into practice the [accountability] principles they campaign
for in others’’ (Zadek 2003, p. 35). This increased push for
NGO accountability has given rise to a whole new set of
‘‘watchdog’’ organizations assessing nonprofits based on
overhead spending and efficiency of operations. As NGOs
are not only faced with more but also often conflicting
demands for accountability, corporate partnerships repre-
sent a significant risk for their legitimacy. Increased col-
laborations with corporate actors (Baur and Palazzo 2011;
A¨hlstro¨m and Sjo¨stro¨m 2005; Servos and Marcuello 2007;
Bendell 2005; Hamann and Acutt 2003; Murphy and
Bendell 1999) may divert their attention away from other
stakeholders; in particular, it may decrease the respon-
siveness to the needs of beneficiaries.
In the third main section, the article discusses in what
ways different notions of CSR either increase or decrease
the likelihood of co-optation. In distinguishing between
strategic and political notions of CSR, we arrive at rec-
ommendations that mitigate co-optation and preserve the
independence of NGOs in such partnerships. In short,
strategic approaches to CSR view collaboration without
changing business practices, for which co-opted NGOs are
the most suitable partners, as the best possible outcome of
business–nonprofit relations. While such a result may
provide corporations with short-term gains in legitimacy,
we argue that a more beneficial and long-term approach to
these partnerships requires adopting a political under-
standing of CSR. Instead of co-opting NGOs, corporations
with such a notion of CSR take an active interest in pro-
moting the critical distance of their NGO partners and are
willing to yield to their demands if they contribute to the
solution of a perceived problem. Short-term profit-maxi-
mization as the main motive prevalent in the strategic
mode of CSR plays a diminished role if corporations
accept that NGOs have a crucial role to play in addressing
social and political problems. As the boundaries between
economic and political spheres are increasingly blurred
(Valente and Crane 2010), collaborating with NGOs in an
equal partnership enhances the capacity to solve problems
that are relevant to both actors. Furthermore, although the
decision to collaborate does not depend on it, such an equal
partnership might also provide corporations with a com-
petitive advantage in the market place in the long run.
The conclusions summarize the main claims and discuss
implications for practice and future research. To convince
corporate actors to yield more frequently to the demands by
NGOs is only feasible if a political notion of CSR also
gains ground in the wide array of self-regulatory agree-
ments such as multi-stakeholder initiatives that among
other things aim at regulating the interaction between
corporations and civil society. Such relationships are not
easy to establish and can only succeed in the long-term if
they do not remain isolated instances, but spread across
entire business sectors.
Co-optation and the Blurring of the For-Profit/
Nonprofit Distinction
A first landmark in research on co-optation was set by
Philip Selznick, an American professor of law and sociol-
ogy, as early as 1948. Selznick introduced the concept of
co-optation in his article on ‘‘Foundations of the Theory of
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Organization,’’ where he characterized it as a ‘‘state of
tension between formal authority and social power’’
(Selznick 1948, p. 35). In subsequent decades, co-optation
has also been dealt with in critical social theory as well as
in cultural studies. Social movement scholars view co-op-
tation as a form of institutionalizing social protest that is
engineered by more powerful groups to demobilize the
opposition and ensure that their demands are watered down
(Piven and Cloward 1977; Lacy 1982; Gamson 1990;
Meyer and Tarrow 1998). An example of the more recent
usage of the concept depicts the gradual corporatization of
the organic food movement as co-optation and states that
‘‘a key premise of co-optation theory is that the capitalist
marketplace transforms the symbols and practices of
countercultural opposition into a constellation of trendy
commodities and depoliticized fashion styles that are
readily assimilated into the societal mainstream’’
(Thompson and Coskuner-Balli 2007, p. 136). What fol-
lows is that co-optation of social movements is ‘‘merely
another chapter in the ongoing saga of countercultural co-
optation at the hands of corporate capitalism’’ (Thompson
and Coskuner-Balli 2007, p. 136).
In line with this broader discussion about the institu-
tionalization of social movements, co-optation is also being
addressed in critical sociology (Shamir 2004) and in criti-
cal management studies (Cooke 2003). Yet, although
political co-optation has been common theme across many
disciplines and is a ‘‘built-in condition of movement poli-
tics’’ (Campbell 2001, p. 354), the co-optation of NGOs
through corporate partnerships has only more recently
garnered more systematic scholarly attention (Trumpy
2008; Utting 2005; Crane and Matten 2007). Scholars have
mentioned co-optation in the context of strategic stake-
holder involvement (Deetz 2007; Holzer 2008) and have
suggested that partnerships between businesses and nonp-
rofits offer too few opportunities to express ‘‘divergent
opinions that would lead to fundamental changes’’
(Seitanidi 2010, p. vii). While some argue strongly that
abandoning the separation between profit and non-profit
world is the only way to effectively address longstanding
social and environmental issues (Pallotta 2008), others
passionately disagree and view the commercialization of
the nonprofit sector as the main reason for the weakening
of the sector (Edwards 2008).
We define co-optation as the ability of a corporation to
‘‘bring the interests of a challenging group into alignment
with its own goals’’ (Trumpy 2008, p. 480). Co-opted
NGOs are gradually absorbed and their organizational
identity is compromised (Brinkerhoff 2002, quoted from
Selsky 2005). Scholars are particularly concerned about the
dangers of co-optation when social movements switch to
institutional strategies and trade critical opposition for
access to corporate targets. As NGOs enter into corporate
partnerships, their focus on developing a working rela-
tionship with a stronger corporation may distract from
pursuing their mission and it may limit their willingness to
use protest and other disruptive strategies, even if such
strategies would be more effective for goal attainment. In
short, it moves maintaining acceptance to the center of
concern (Gamson 1975). While the literature has provided
compelling evidence about how co-optation occurs and
may even be associated with business–nonprofit partner-
ships, we argue that what is largely missing from this
debate is how accountability pressures on NGOs frequently
have the unintended consequence of increasing the likeli-
hood of co-optation.
NGOs—Watchdogs, Lobbyists, Partners, and Service
Providers
NGOs fulfill a broad set of roles as civil society actors and
use an equally broad range of strategies to pursue their
objectives. Although there is no consensus on how to
define and classify NGOs, existing definitions point to a
number of similarities distinguishing those actors from
political parties or corporations. For Willetts (2002), an
NGO is an ‘‘independent voluntary association of people
acting together on a continuous basis, for some common
purpose, other than achieving government office, making
money or illegal activities.’’ For Martens (2002), ‘‘NGOs
are formal (professionalized) independent societal organi-
zations whose primary aim is to promote common goals at
the national or the international level.’’ For our purposes, it
is key that NGOs are autonomous before entering a cor-
porate partnership (otherwise, they are already co-opted).
Our emphasis is primarily on those NGOs that the literature
variously labels advocacy or watchdog organizations, i.e.
groups that mobilize for policy change rather than engage
primarily in service delivery. This distinction also applies
to NGO activities towards corporate actors where the goal
of policy change is better known by the term ‘‘corporate
reform’’ and it is used by the social movement literature
when referring to outsider/insider or institutionalized/non-
institutionalized strategies (Trumpy 2008). From a corpo-
rate perspective, Holzer (2008) argues that corporate
managers distinguish between ‘‘‘cooperation-oriented’ and
‘event-oriented’ groups that is, those that the company can
deal with and those whose demands are deemed too radi-
cal’’ (p. 56). The latter are perceived to be exclusively
interested in challenging corporations without being inter-
ested in working with them because they see them only as
part of the problem but not of the solution (Den Hond and
De Bakker 2007).
For advocacy NGOs, independence is a core credential
and sign of legitimacy. Being adversarial and independent
from the business it monitors (Muller and Van Tulder
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2006) is crucial for the credibility of self-appointed activ-
ists. The same independence from corporate interests is
crucial when NGOs assume other roles beyond serving as
watchdogs, including consumer activism (i.e. the effort to
inform consumers about specific products or companies) or
litigation that is the type of activism where courts are used
by activists and victims to prosecute corporate malpractice
(Utting 2005).
Engaging directly with corporate actors and employing
more reformist strategies comes with risks and trade-offs.
NGOs may want to have more direct access to decision
makers in hopes of affecting corporate behavior from the
inside. Other NGOs may be less driven by concerns for
effectiveness and more by the constant struggle for orga-
nizational survival. Scholte (2004) links the transition from
watchdogs to co-opted NGOs to the eagerness of some
civil society organizations to obtain funds which in his eyes
compromises their autonomy: ‘‘These co-opted organiza-
tions become voices of—rather than watchdogs over—
official agencies, political parties and powerful individuals
in global governance’’ (p. 224).
As some NGOs are increasingly drawn ‘‘into service-
delivery functions and market relations’’ and ‘‘an increas-
ing number (of them, the authors) became part of a
growing CSR industry of service providers’’ (Utting 2005,
p. 376), the risk of co-optation rises. With the engagement
of NGOs in business-type activities ‘‘a whole commercial
market develops around shaping, assessing, and consulting
on the desired dimensions of social responsibility. A new
breed of strategic consultants is also emerging in this new
potentially lucrative field’’ (Shamir 2004, p. 678).
The question that arises is ‘‘As and when greater num-
bers of NGOs begin to think and act more commercially, to
what extent will they be able to remain effective corporate
watchdogs?’’ (Murphy and Bendell 1999, p. 8). So far, the
literature only provides rather general and sometimes
ideologically driven conclusions. Some note rather factu-
ally that ‘‘business interests and NGOs are becoming more
aligned’’ (Yaziji and Doh 2009, p. 30; also Jamison 1996,
p. 234; and Holzer 2008, p. 55), whereas others state that
‘‘the social theory dimension of non-profit organisations
has ‘withered in the face of the dominance of capitalist
forms of socialisation’’’ (Jegers and Lapsley 2001, p. 2).
Kaldor et al. (2003) claim that NGOs partnering with
corporations engage in ‘‘corporatization’’ (p. 9). Yet, it
remains still unclear under what conditions co-optation
takes place, what strategies NGOs may use to maintain
their critical attitude even when entering into cooperative
relationships with corporations, and what roles corpora-
tions and their notions of CSR play in fostering or inhib-
iting the co-optation of NGOs.
Drivers of Co-Optation: Active Role of Corporations
Co-optation understood as the loss of NGO autonomy
when engaging with corporate partners may be the result of
a deliberate strategy of the usually financially much
stronger for-profit organization. Lucea (2010) argues that
co-optation of those who pursue agendas in conflict with
one’s own is an important rationale for firms to engage
with NGOs. In contrast, NGOs may be motivated to
cooperate with firms because they view the idea of CSR as
an opening for shaping corporate mindsets from within.
The actual outcomes of these interactions remain poorly
understood and ‘‘the ways and means by which corpora-
tions or corporate-friendly non-profit organizations infuse
meaning into the very idea of responsibility, and the way
such entities symbolically negotiate the scope and sub-
stantive contours of the term has hardly been considered’’
(Shamir 2004, p. 675). Although the initial motives of both
sides in these emerging partnerships matter, the dynamics
of the interactions can produce different results, including
learning on the part of the corporation or the co-optation of
the NGO.
Firms may seek collaboration with NGOs in order to
control the fallout of civil society mobilization against their
unethical behavior and as a way of controlling or antic-
ipating such actions in the future (Dahan et al. 2010). For
businesses, being pro-active is crucial in regaining control
and ‘‘not simply responding or reacting to pressure but
itself mobilising to influence control, and lead the agenda
of institutional reform’’ (Utting 2005, p. 375, emphasis
added).
A key step towards regaining control of the agenda and
lessening the pressure from civil society is the process of
stakeholder identification (Mitchell et al. 1997). If corpo-
rations elect to work with less critical groups, co-optation
is a likely long-term outcome of the interaction. Holzer
illustrates this with respect to the relations between Shell
and its stakeholders in Nigeria. In a volatile social envi-
ronment, it was difficult for Shell to engage with stake-
holders because the most important among them, i.e. the
MOSOP (Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People),
proved to be very elusive and therefore, at least in the
beginning, was not recognized by Shell as a stakeholder.
Shell preferred to negotiate instead with ‘‘more pliable
local contacts,’’ i.e. with ‘‘conservative leaders who were
known as the Shell Chiefs’’ (Holzer 2008, p. 57). The
lesson is that corporations have choices in responding to
civil society mobilization and they ‘‘may make a virtue of
necessity and create suitable and moderate partners them-
selves, as Shell did with the Shell Chiefs in Nigeria’’
(Holzer 2008, p. 58).
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The Process of Co-optation: Sponsoring, Labeling
and Certification, Personalties
Corporations have forged a wide array of relationships with
nonprofits, including various forms of corporate sponsor-
ing, the establishment of certification or labeling agree-
ments, and greater personal ties across the corporate–
nonprofit divide. In all of these relationships, co-optation of
the nonprofit partner is more likely if safeguards against
such an outcome are not established early on as part of the
partnership.
The most common road to co-optation is corporate
sponsoring. Sponsoring is particularly problematic because
it can create a resource dependency for NGOs, compro-
mising their ability to challenge corporate behavior. As
Shamir (2004) observes there is an increasing number of
‘‘corporate-sponsored and corporate-oriented NGOs’’
which he calls ‘‘MaNGOs (Market Non-Governmental
Organizations)’’ (p. 671). According to Shamir, such
MaNGOs strive to shape notions of social responsibility in
ways that are in accordance with the concerns of business.
Corporate sponsoring is particularly attractive as a way of
diversifying NGO revenue and when partners are active in
separate fields. The example of Save the Children and its
quest for corporate support from companies such as Coca-
Cola and Pepsi is particularly instructive in this regard. As
long as Save the Children used corporate funding exclu-
sively for its humanitarian and development work abroad,
both sides gained financial and reputational benefits and the
relationship was harmonious. But when Save the Children
began to take an interest in child obesity in the United
States and tentatively supported soda tax campaigns
mounted in various states by local organizations working
on child health issues, the conflict with corporate interests
quickly led the Save the Children leadership to decide that
‘‘it was too controversial to continue’’ (Neuman 2010, p.
B1). In this case, co-optation is particularly subtle as Save
the Children may not have faced any direct pressure from
its corporate sponsors, but decided on its own that the soda
tax campaign was not a core concern for the organization.
A second process increasing the risk for NGO co-opta-
tion is associated with the rapid expansion of certification
and labeling agreements in which NGOs directly or indi-
rectly endorse the products a company sells (Murphy and
Bendell 1999). Such economic cooperation is characteristic
of the increasing commodification of NGO activities
(Uphoff 1996, quoted from Murphy and Bendell 1999,
p. 8). Covey and Brown (2001) use a case to illustrate how
co-optation can arise if an NGO enters into a labeling
agreement with a corporation: the Canadian grocery chain
Loblaws, without being under pressure from the environ-
mental movement or consumers, proposed an endorsement
scheme for environmentally friendly products to an NGO
called Pollution Probe (PP). PP was expected to help
Loblaws with its expertise and legitimacy to pursue an
‘‘innovative marketing venture’’ (Covey and Brown 2001,
p. 10). In return, PP would get a 1% royalty on green
product sales and 1 USD for each ‘‘green’’ T-Shirt or
sweatshirt sold. So far, PP had been considered to be a
‘‘technically competent watchdog’’ (Covey and Brown
2001, p. 10), but on collaborating with Loblaws, it stopped
to challenge business interests publicly. Its approach to
business moved from ‘‘finger pointing’’ to collaboration.
Greenpeace, a rival environmental NGO, then publicly
challenged the endorsement given by PP.1 The problem
with the agreement between PP and Loblaws was that it
‘‘provided few options for PP to safeguard its own inter-
ests, implying that PP did not focus on some key interests it
had at stake in the situation. The agreement, for example,
had no provision for PP to test the products to be endorsed
or to publish results of any tests it might carry out (…)
When challenged by Greenpeace, PP could point to no
detailed agreement that offered evidence of its continuing
independence as a public watchdog’’ (Covey and Brown
2001, p. 11). As a lesson learned, PP adopted policy criteria
for future endorsements in order to avoid co-optation.
And finally, there are also increasing personal ties
between profit and nonprofit sector that may lead to co-
optation (MacDonald 2008). Increasingly, corporate lead-
ers are recruited by NGOs concerned about resource
acquisition and management challenges associated with a
more competitive fundraising environment. In Switzerland,
the appointment of the general director of Nestle´ to the
board of trustees of the NGO Swiss Interchurch Aid caused
fierce criticism from activists. Although Swiss Interchurch
Aid recruited the Nestle´ manager in order to increase its
access to corporate circles and acquire much needed
financial expertise (Meier 2008), critics diagnosed an
‘‘institutional incompatibility’’ between the interests of
Nestle´ and the ability of the NGO to effectively advocate
for human rights, in particular the affordable access to
drinking water.
These three examples of intensified corporate–nonprofit
relationships involve particular risks and rewards espe-
cially for the NGO involved. Co-optation is not necessarily
1 A similar case is currently evolving around the Marine Stewardship
Council’s (MSC) certification of the Norwegian company Aker
BioMarine’s krill harvest as environmentally sustainable. Greenpeace
criticizes that the MSC has given ‘‘an unofficial nod to the basic idea
that vacuuming up the tiny life forms forming the foundations of the
oceanic ecosystem is an acceptable practice’’ (Jolly 2010). Green-
peace’s criticism convinced the world’s leading organic food retailer
Whole Foods Market to halt the sales of krill oil because of
sustainability issues. This shows that certification does not guarantee
a corporation the legitimacy and the hoped-for monetary gains, if a
watchdog NGO at the same time chooses to put this corporation on a
red list (Whole Foods Magazine Staff 2010).
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the end result in any of these interactions, but NGOs rarely
enter into such agreements with a full understanding of the
possible ramifications and possible costs involved. There is
an inherent risk that these types of relationships enhance
the existing imbalance of power in favor of the corpora-
tions because corporations often engage with NGOs with a
deliberate strategy of risk control. Furthermore, direct
sponsoring, cooperation on labeling and certification, and
recruitment of corporate leaders can raise alarm among
supporters and the general public and may also give other
NGOs reasons to distance themselves. While working with
corporate partners can have many advantages, NGOs have
to enter such relationships with an utmost concern for
maintaining their own autonomy, and as we will argue
later, depending on their notion of CSR, companies are
well-advised to abstain from mechanisms that foster co-
optation. In the subsequent section, we show how debates
about NGO accountability make it even more difficult for
civil society groups to maintain their independence and
avoid co-optation.
NGO Accountability Debates
Accountability defines a relationship between an organi-
zation and a set of stakeholders and assumes that being
responsive to those stakeholders will be beneficial to the
NGO and its mandate. Accountability mechanisms for
NGOs are ‘‘the means through which individuals and
organizations are held externally to account for their
actions and (…) the means by which they take internal
responsibility for continuously shaping and scrutinizing
organizational mission, goals, and performance’’ (Ebrahim
2003a, p. 194). Accountability establishes relationships,
defining ‘‘the rights of society (or groups/stakeholders
within society) and relates to the rights that emerge from
the relationship between the accountable organization (the
accountor) and the accountee’’ (Gray et al. 2006, p. 334).
The legitimacy and accountability of transnational non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) has become a major
topic of academic and policy debate (Collingwood and
Logister 2005; Jordan and van Tuijl 2006; McGann and
Johnston 2006; Clark 1995; Edwards and Hulme 1996;
Najam 1996; Brett 1993; Brown 2008; Ebrahim 2003b;
O’Dwyer and Unerman 2008, 2007; Gray et al. 2006). As
NGOs have become increasingly prominent players in
global affairs, more questions about their legitimacy and
accountability have been raised by scholars and policy-
makers. Several factors have fed into a growing concern for
NGO accountability. First, since NGOs frequently demand
accountability from state and corporate actors, they are
increasingly asked to meet the same standards of trans-
parency and responsiveness. As transnational NGOs made
‘‘accountability politics’’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998) one of
their key weapons in mobilizing for human rights and
environmental protection, some of those same demands
were thrown back at the non-governmental sector (Zadek
2003, p. 35). Although many NGOs claim to represent the
poor and marginalized (Slim 2002; Brown 2008), very few
have established effective ‘‘bottom-up’’ (‘‘downward
accountability’’) measures to ensure effective input into
decision making from the beneficiaries (Bebbington 2005).
Furthermore, when NGOs act as service providers and
substitute for the provision of services by the government,
their actions may be a valuable short-term fix, but in the
long term, such service provision can undermine the
establishment of democratic accountability mechanisms
between a government and its own population. NGOs as
external actors remain primarily accountable to their
donors and their presence usually leads to a fragmentation
of service provision as well as greater variation in the
quality of services provided compared with the alternative
of a strengthened governmental presence (Robinson and
White 1997).
Along with the growing presence and role of NGOs,
scholars and policymakers became increasingly aware of the
challenges associated with shifting funding and responsi-
bilities to the non-governmental sector. The literature on
NGO accountability has for some time lamented that NGOs
pay too much attention to donors and not enough to benefi-
ciaries and frequently reduce accountability to mere finan-
cial accounting without fully involving those affected by
their activities (Kilby 2006; Slim 2002). Concerns about
organizational survival and increased competition for
funding lead to a dominance of ‘‘upward’’ accountability
(Chaplowe and Engo-Tjega 2007; Arenas et al. 2009; Bruno-
van Vijfeijken and Schmitz 2008; Schmitz et al. 2010).
Traditional notions of accountability privilege relations to
donors and discourage learning from failures (Ebrahim
2005) because donors demand success stories and often care
more about how their money is spent than what long-term
difference a program has made (Bebbington 2005).
In the context of these complex accountability chal-
lenges faced by NGOs, we argue here that business–
nonprofit partnerships are likely to undermine the strug-
gle to be more accountable to beneficiaries. As NGOs
increasingly add corporate actors to the list of external
stakeholders to which they feel directly obliged, donors
remain the dominant focus of accountability and benefi-
ciaries will have an even more difficult time to be heard. In
the next section, we discuss how the rise of financial
watchdogs, such as Charity Navigator, has further inten-
sified this trend by forcing NGOs to pay more attention to
issues such as overhead spending and efficiency, rather
than responsiveness to those affected by their program
activities (Schmitz and Mitchell 2009).
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Upward Accountability and the Trend Towards
Financial Metrics
The increasing scrutiny NGOs have faced with regard to their
legitimacy and accountability in recent years has led to the
emergence of NGO watchdogs and special initiatives that
create a diverse and sometimes conflicting set of new
incentives. The most controversial result has been an inten-
sified focus on overhead spending that has strengthened
donor influence and, as we argue later, is also likely to
strengthen the position of business partners and weaken the
position of NGOs when collaborating with business partners.
Although the dominance of upward accountability
towards donors is nothing new, the recent emergence of an
overhead-focused ‘‘accountability industry’’ has further
shrunk the autonomy of many NGOs. Strengthening the
legitimacy and accountability of NGOs does not neces-
sarily compromise their autonomy and independence
and many scholars and practitioners insist that it is an
opportunity to ‘‘actively construct legitimacy arguments
and accountability systems’’ (Brown 2008, p. 11). Some
players in this field, including One World Trust (http://
www.oneworldtrust.org; also: AccountAbility, the Global
Reporting Initiative (GRI) and the Humanitarian Account-
ability Partnership, HAP), seek to promote innovative
reporting and accountability systems designed to make
accountability an asset in the process of learning from past
successes and failures (Ebrahim 2005; Gray et al. 2006).
But a competing trend of increased emphasis on overhead
spending and financial metrics has narrowed accountability
questions to a matter of accounting for output (rather than
impact). This trend is most visible in the United States and
driven by NGO watchdogs such as Charity Navigator,
Guidestar, and the American Philanthropic Institute. While
these watchdogs promise potential donors guidance in an
increasingly complex landscape of non-profit activities,
their primary reliance on financial data perpetuates a
dominance of donor interests over those of beneficiaries
(Jordan and van Tuijl 2006), threatens the organizational
survival of nonprofits (Wing and Hager 2004), and creates
incentives to underreport spending on fundraising and
administrative costs (Hager and Flack 2004). The
accountability perspective advocated by these organiza-
tions reflects a desire to find ‘‘analogues for the commercial
‘bottom line’’’ (Gray et al. 2006, p. 334), which leads to
dysfunctional behavior and distracts from the actual
effectiveness of a nonprofit’s activities (Lowell et al.
2005).2
How Upward Accountability Promotes Co-optation
The dominance of upward accountability has, by and large,
been strengthened by the appearance of NGO watchdogs
during the past decade. Even before Charity Navigator and
others began to collect and publish financial data of
nonprofits, scholars were long concerned about the
‘‘‘puppetisation’ of NGOs’’’ (Najam 1996, p. 344) and
focused attention on the lack of input by those affected by
the activities of NGOs. In this context, strengthening
accountability often means even more ‘‘emphasis among
nonprofits and funders on the upwards and compliance
dimensions of accountability’’ and ‘‘skews organizational
attention towards the interests of those who control critical
resources’’ (Ebrahim 2010, p. 26).
The emphasis on quantifiable results privileges outputs
and distracts from questions of actual impact and demo-
cratic input (Eikenberry and Kluver 2004), causing NGOs
to become more like corporations as both ‘‘populate the
same ‘area of institutional life’ […] and a common orga-
nizational field (DiMaggio and Powell 1983)’’ (Lucea
2010, p. 116). This emphasis on upward accountability
threatens the unique role civil society plays by offering an
alternative to markets and the state (hierarchy) as the
dominant forms of social organizations. Although an
increased concern for legitimacy and accountability offers
many opportunities for NGOs to improve their operations,
most remain passive and respond defensively to those
demands. As a result, other groups, including NGO
watchdogs or corporate partners, become the driving
force and set the agenda for NGOs. This can easily result
in compromising their original mission and fostering
co-optation. Michael Edwards (2008) provides evidence
for this danger when finding that 22 out of 25 US-based
NGO–business joint ventures had experienced ‘‘significant
conflicts between mission and the demands of corporate
stakeholders’’ (p. 39). The two financially most successful
ventures deviated most from their social mission, ‘‘reduc-
ing time and resources spent on advocacy, weeding out
clients who were more difficult to serve, and focusing on
activities with the greatest revenue-generating potential’’
(p. 39). Ebrahim (2010) concurs, arguing that current
practices ‘‘reward nonprofits for short-term responses with
quick and tangible impacts, while neglecting longer-term
strategic responses or riskier innovations that can address
more systemic issues of social and political’’ or as we
might add: corporate ‘‘change’’ (p. 26). Partnerships with
corporations usually reproduce the same material inequal-
ity that is a signature of donor–NGO relations and they
introduce a market-driven logic into the nonprofit sector.
Although this does not inevitably lead to co-optation, the
difficulties of establishing meaningful processes of down-
ward accountability indicate that NGOs have to be
2 It is important to note that NGO watchdogs such as Charity
Navigator have recently embarked on efforts to overhaul their rating
systems and supplement financial measures with other criteria,
including transparency and reputation among peers and beneficiaries
(Ogden 2009).
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proactive if they want to avoid compromising their
autonomy and independence in these collaborative
arrangements. This is also in the best interest of their
corporate partners because such independence is crucial for
the long-term credibility of the collaboration.
Implications for Different Conceptions of CSR
The increasingly efficiency-driven demand for NGO
accountability increases the risks of co-optation of NGOs
by corporate interests. However, depending on what
notions of CSR corporations adhere to, this control of the
NGO agenda must not necessarily lead to a heightened risk
of co-optation. In the following, we introduce different
notions of CSR that influence in what ways a corporation
approaches business–nonprofit partnerships. We distin-
guish between strategic and political CSR and explain in
what ways different approaches either increase the risk of
NGO co-optation or strengthen the legitimacy of NGOs by
preserving their independence (for different classifications
of strands of CSR, see Nijhof et al. 2008; Scherer and
Palazzo 2007; Garriga and Mele´ 2004; Windsor 2006;
Carroll 1999).
Strategic Conceptions of CSR
Strategic notions of CSR are based on the premise that it is
the foremost role of companies in a capitalist society to
earn and maximize profits. In Milton Friedman’s (1970)
famous version of this view ‘‘the social responsibility of
business is to increase its profits.’’ More recent proponents
of a strategic notion have moved away from entirely
reducing social responsibility to profit making, but still
insist that it primarily has value as a ‘‘source of opportu-
nity, innovation, and competitive advantage’’ (Porter and
Kramer 2006, p. 80). This perspective no longer assumes
that making profits is the only way of being socially
responsible, but it seeks to identify those specific oppor-
tunities where businesses can gain from a partnership
without having to compromise any of their core interests
and goals. This notion of ‘‘responsible profitability’’ (see,
e.g., Carroll 1991) offers opportunities for businesses to
contribute to ‘‘worthy social causes’’ (Shamir 2004,
p. 683).
Proponents of strategic CSR share a ‘‘harmonistic
world-view’’ (Ulrich 2008, p. 402) that de-emphasizes
potential conflict in which socially responsible behavior
would be preferable in principle but does not pay off in
terms of profits. Still, different versions of strategic CSR
have very different consequences for potential nonprofit
partners. A purely charitable approach entails giving
donations for social or cultural purposes after profits,
whereas a more proactive approach to philanthropy may
entail more meaningful interactions between businesses
and nonprofits having potential effects on corporate
behavior (Ulrich 2008). In both versions, instrumental
rationality prevails and ‘‘doing good’’ always depends on
‘‘doing well’’ (Shamir 2004). There is thus no intrinsic
reason for CSR that would derive from the assumption that
corporations do it because it ‘‘is the right thing to do’’
(Margolis and Walsh 2003, p. 282). Instead, the underlying
motivation for strategic CSR is the self-interest of corpo-
rations (Matten and Crane 2005).
The harmonistic worldview behind strategic CSR man-
ifests itself in the interactions between corporations and
NGOs. The selection and identification of partner NGO is
driven by the question whether there is ‘‘a potential for a
win–win situation for both/all parties?’’ (Muller and Van
Tulder 2006, p. 22). A win–win situation requires that the
stakeholder engagement is non-adversarial. Apparently, as
Shamir (2004) argues, corporate executives who received
their CSR training from market-oriented NGOs found
themselves reluctant to see CSR as a ‘‘site of potential
conflict between core business practices and social issues’’
(p. 681). Instead, they were trained to embrace CSR as a
business opportunity that ‘‘has to be managed with an eye
to the strategies, goals and methods of the business enter-
prise as a whole’’ (p. 684).
A strategic CSR approach offers only limited opportu-
nities for NGOs to transform corporate behavior. In most
cases, it likely reflects a strategy of risk control, whereby a
corporation seeks to pull the teeth from watchdog NGOs
and align their interests with the economic interests of the
corporation (Nijhof et al. 2008). Such co-optation can
enhance corporate reputation without compromising the
business model and profitability. For example, Coca-Cola
successfully used a strategic notion of CSR in dealing with
a Greenpeace campaign mounted against its refrigeration
practices between 1998 and 2005: ‘‘Co-optation occurs if
Coca-Cola receives credit for becoming more environ-
mentally friendly without actually altering its actions in
any way’’ (Trumpy 2008, p. 488). Under such circum-
stances, the co-opted NGO can be used to endow the cor-
poration ‘‘with increased legitimacy and reestablish
stability’’ (Trumpy 2008, p. 486) without undertaking
corporate reform or giving an NGO real influence.
There are different models of strategic CSR, ranging
from a purely profit-driven view to allowing for some
altruistic motives being added to corporate behavior. We
argue here that current trends pushing financial notions of
NGO accountability increase the likelihood of co-optation,
in particular when corporate partners adhere to a strategic
CSR model. By avoiding partnerships with critical NGOs
and by largely subjecting philanthropic efforts to the goal
of making profits, strategic CSR avoids or neutralizes a
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direct influence of NGOs on corporate practices. In the
context of shifting demands for NGO accountability, such
partnerships lack an expressed goal of fostering or at least
maintaining the independence of NGOs and cultivating
open debate that may question corporate practices. Instead,
collaboration based on strategic CSR is more likely to
strengthen the obligations NGOs have towards donors and
corporate partners. NGOs may gain financial resources in
such partnerships, but they are not likely to influence the
behavior of their usually much wealthier partner.
Political Conceptions of CSR
Beyond the dominant strategic notion of CSR, some
scholars have developed an important alternative strand of
CSR that views the business firm not only as an economic
but increasingly also a political actor in a globalizing world
(e.g. Scherer et al. 2006; Scherer and Palazzo 2007;
Wettstein 2009; Crane and Matten 2007; Valente and
Crane 2010; Moon et al. 2005). Political CSR puts greater
emphasis on one of the original reasons for advancing the
CSR agenda, namely, to hold multinational corporations
accountable for the increasing power and influence they
exercise in their daily decision making (Garriga and Mele´
2004; Carroll 1999; Utting 2005).
The extent of the power that corporations hold is mir-
rored in the claims that are raised towards them. Multi-
national corporations are not only held accountable for how
they produce goods or services for the market but also for
how they respond to diverging expectations expressed by
their shareholders, employees, suppliers, the communities
in which they operate, and the state and the general public.
As a growing number of corporations are under pressure
to address negative ecological and social external effects
of their operations (Ulrich 2008), the CSR agenda is
increasingly broadening to include direct responsibilities
regarding the promotion of environmental, labor, and
human rights standards (Walsh et al. 2003). These goals are
pursued through self-regulation (codes of conduct) as well
as standard-setting and -monitoring by external agents,
including the GRI, the Fair Labor Association (FLA),
AccountAbility 1000 (AA 1000), Social Accountability
8000 (SA 8000), or the UN Global Compact (Gilbert and
Rasche 2007, p. 187).
Similar to the case of strategic CSR, there are more
principled and more pragmatic variants of a more political
understanding of CSR. More principled variants adopt that
corporations adopt responsibility for their environmental
and societal impacts because they inherently believe this to
be the right thing to do (Margolis and Walsh 2003; Nijhof
et al. 2008; Vachani et al. 2009). More pragmatic versions
do not assume such principled commitment, but simply
claim that corporations engage in CSR whenever
governments are not providing public services needed to
sustain particular business activities (Valente and Crane
2010). In either case, corporations then take on significant
responsibilities that likely entail sharing power with local
communities and NGOs.
Political CSR explicitly ascribes NGOs the role of
watchdogs that publicly raise concerns over the legitimacy of
corporate activities (Scherer and Palazzo 2007, p. 1112).
Broadly speaking, political CSR does not shy the ‘‘scrutiny
of open public debate, review, and determination’’ (Fung
2003, p. 52) and in contrast to the strategic notion of CSR, the
political notion is not afraid of conflict because its aim is not
to create ‘‘value-based homogeneity’’ (Scherer and Palazzo
2007, p. 1114) but rather to effectively contribute to the
solution of a perceived societal or environmental problem,
even if it may not directly contribute to the generation of
profits. Corporations that adhere to political CSR may even
be willing to undertake corporate reform and yield to the
challenging group if necessary, that is, if it contributes to the
solution of a perceived problem (Trumpy 2008). One could
then say that political CSR acknowledges and to a certain
extent even relies on the intrinsic value of watchdog NGOs
because they are seen as legitimate actors with valuable
knowledge on the problems around which CSR centers.
A convincing account of how a corporation that
acknowledges the intrinsic value of NGOs argues is pre-
sented by an external affairs adviser at Shell. This adviser
describes the delicate balance of Shell’s relationship with
Amnesty International as follows:
We value their independence and the independent
integrity as much as other people do. It’s their most
precious resource and we must never do anything to
compromise that. So, in some regard, we don’t want
to get too pally with Amnesty because that would
undermine their very value in the first place. (Holzer
2008, p. 56)
If we translate this statement into the language of this
article it means: Shell will do anything not to co-opt
Amnesty International because they recognize their
intrinsic value as independent and integer watchdogs.
What are the implications of political CSR for NGO
accountability? In contrast to strategic CSR, political CSR
does not benefit from the current trend towards empha-
sizing the upward accountability of NGOs. On the one
hand, corporations with a political notion of CSR can be
expected to care strongly about NGO accountability
because it would seem logical for them to have their
legitimacy judged by strong and independent actors. On the
other hand, such corporations find their endeavors under-
mined if more NGOs adapt themselves to upward
accountability and if upward accountability becomes an
increasingly accepted standard for NGO accountability.
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We do expect that corporations with a political notion of
CSR abstain from co-opting measures that might distort the
agenda of watchdog NGOs. Instead, they are most likely to
leave them certain ‘‘room to manoeuvre’’ with regard to
how they achieve their mission and they might promote the
accountability of the NGOs with whom they engage
towards their beneficiaries. After all, it is in the enlightened
self-interest of such corporations to contribute to a shifting
perspective on NGO accountability and to support the
above-mentioned aspirations of NGO watchdogs to over-
haul their rating systems towards a more beneficiary-
oriented perspective on NGO accountability.
Conclusions
Bridging the literatures on CSR and NGO accountability
adds distinct insights into the challenges associated with
business–nonprofit partnerships. Critical evaluations of
such partnerships have for some time questioned the effi-
cacy of such arrangements from an NGO perspective and
an extensive literature has also described in what ways
social movement institutionalization can lead to co-opta-
tion. This article adds to these claims a more specific
understanding of how increasing accountability demands
on both businesses and nonprofits can have unintended
negative consequences. In particular, pressures on NGOs to
limit overhead spending and to emphasize financial
accounting create unique vulnerabilities for co-optation
when entering partnerships with corporate actors.
From a business perspective, the approach to CSR has
also a powerful effect on the likelihood of NGO co-opta-
tion. A narrowly defined strategic view conceptualizes
corporations only as economic actors and largely ignores
the broader political implications of their activities. When a
corporation follows such a perspective in entering a busi-
ness–nonprofit partnership, co-optation is more likely
because the independence of the partner organization is not
an explicit goal of the relationship established. In contrast,
if a corporation takes seriously its role and responsibilities
as a political actor, it is more open to weighing goals other
than profitability in its decision making. Political CSR
offers a valuable perspective by exhorting businesses to
accept the critical role of watchdog NGOs as an inherent
part of their social responsibility.
If not all solutions to social problems are market-driven,
then NGOs can play an important role in providing cor-
porations with needed information and policy options that
contribute not only to the solution of a perceived envi-
ronmental or social problem but also to the long-term
sustainability and expansion of their business. In return,
this requires corporations to be more accepting of feedback
which may, in the short term, not generate additional
profits or even create costs. In this model, businesses would
also take a stronger interest in the strengthening and
independence of those NGOs that can provide the most
credible information, even if it challenges their corporate
practices. In particular, businesses would endeavor to use
partnerships with nonprofits to strengthen ‘‘downward
accountability’’ and work actively against dependence on
donors. Co-opted partner NGOs are unlikely to provide
continuous feedback that allows a corporation to adapt its
business practices and preempt problems in the future.
Respecting or even enhancing the independence of NGO
partners also creates more credibility with the general
public and might even provide a competitive advantage in
the market place. Corporate partners also need to engage in
debates around NGO accountability and explicitly chal-
lenge the current model as promoted by NGO watchdogs
that is entirely focused on efficiency and overhead spend-
ing. Corporations should join forces with innovative
reporting and accountability systems that shift attention
towards the actual effectiveness and impact of NGO
activities.
While this article broadly sketches out some of the
possible outcomes of business–nonprofit partnerships,
future research should investigate more systematically in
what ways different CSR approaches affect those collab-
orations and the NGO partners. We expect that the par-
ticular type of industry and substance of collaboration play
a crucial role in determining not only the willingness of a
business to adopt a broader understanding of CSR but also
the possible gains for both parties. Future research should
not only focus on variation on the corporate side but also
take more seriously differences among NGO partners and
their strategies. For example, additional research is needed
to better understand what type of strategies targeting cor-
porate actors are most likely to elicit a response leading to
sustainable change along the demands put forth by NGOs.
The idea that corporations take on greater and more
politically meaningful responsibilities as well as share
power with NGOs and local communities remains for many
an idealistic proposition. Even among corporations that
follow a more political notion of CSR, pragmatic motiva-
tions are likely to dominate. The main challenge we see
emerges early in the interaction between corporation and
NGO. By definition, only NGOs with a rather antagonistic
agenda can be co-opted and any campaign waged against a
corporation will initially result in an exchange of attacks,
denials, and rejection. The question is how both parties can
move beyond this initial stage and develop sufficient
common ground to engage in a relationship of critical
collaboration. Such an engagement will always be strained
by the different organizational cultures separating the for-
profit from the nonprofit world. Success of a more political
CSR approach also depends on a relatively rapid diffusion
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of the concept across the entire industry and on its mani-
festation in voluntary frameworks as provided by multi-
stakeholder initiatives, forums, or councils that aim at
regulating the interaction between corporations and civil
society actors. If not, NGOs may temporarily succeed in
affecting the behavior of selected individual businesses, but
those corporations disappear or break their agreements in
the long run because of competitive pressure. Ensuring that
certain standards of corporate conduct are evenly applied
across sectors likely requires moving beyond the particular
business–nonprofit partnership to the self-regulatory level
of multi-stakeholder initiatives and to the regulatory level
of nation states and international agreements.
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